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ABSTRACT
The problem of data exchange involves a source schema, a target
schema and a set of mappings from transforming the data between
the two schemas. We study the problem of data exchange in the
presence of privacy restrictions on the source. The privacy restric-
tions are expressed as a set of policy views representing the infor-
mation that is safe to expose over all instances of the source. We
propose a protocol that provides formal privacy guarantees and is
data-independent, i.e., if certain criteria are met, then the protocol
guarantees that the mappings leak no sensitive information inde-
pendently of the data that lies in the source. We also propose an
algorithm for repairing an input mapping w.r.t. a set of policy views,
in cases where the input mapping leaks sensitive information. The
empirical evaluation of our work shows that the proposed algo-
rithm is quite efficient, repairing sets of 300 s-t tgds in an average
time of 5s on a commodity machine. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first one that studies the problems of exchang-
ing data and repairing mappings under such privacy restrictions.
Furthermore, our work is the first to provide practical algorithms
for a logical privacy-preservation paradigm, described as an open
research challenge in previous work on this area.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Data exchange.
KEYWORDS
privacy-preserving data integration, data exchange, mapping re-
pairs
1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of exchanging data between a source
schema S and a target schema T via a set of source-to-target (s-t)
dependencies Σst that usually come in the form of tuple-generating
dependencies (tgds). This triple of a source schema, a target schema
and a set of dependencies is called amapping. The s-t dependencies
specify how and what source data should appear in the target and
are expressed as sentences in first-order logic [10].
Our work considers a privacy-aware variant of the data exchange
problem, in which the source comes with a set of constraints, repre-
senting the data that is safe to expose to the target over all instances
of the source. We also assume that all users, both the malicious
and the non-malicious ones, might know the source and the target
schema, the data in the target as well as the s-t tgds. Under these
assumptions, our work will address the following issues: how could
we represent privacy restrictions on the sources and what would
it mean for a data exchange setting to be safe under the proposed
source instance
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unsafe instance
over schema T
safe instance
over schema T
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Figure 1: A data exchange setting with mappings and policy
views.
privacy restrictions?; assuming that the privacy-preservation pro-
tocol is fixed, how could we assess the safety of a data exchange
setting w.r.t. the privacy restrictions and provide strong guarantees
of no privacy leak?; finally, in case of privacy violations, how could
we repair the s-t tgds?
Regarding the first issue, we assume that the restrictions on the
sources are expressed as a set of views, called policy views. Inspired
by prior work on privacy-preservation [3, 13], we define a set of s-t
tgds to be safe w.r.t. the policy views if every positive information
that is kept secret by the policy views is also kept secret by the s-t
tgds. As we will see in subsequent sections, the proposed privacy-
preservation protocol is data-independent allowing us to provide
strong privacy-preservation guarantees over all instances of the
sources. The above addresses the second aforementioned issue, as
well. Regarding the third issue, our work proposes a repairing algo-
rithm for the proposed privacy-preservation protocol. The feature
of the proposed repairing algorithm is that it can employ techniques
for learning the user preferences during the repairing process. The
empirical evaluation of our work over an existing benchmark shows
that the proposed algorithm is quite efficient. Indeed it can repair a
set of 300 s-t tgds in less than 5s on a commodity machine.
Our secure data exchange setting is exemplified in Figure 1 and
in the following running example inspired by a real world scenario
from an hospital in the UK1.
Example 1. Consider the source schema S consisting of the follow-
ing relations: P, HN, HS, O and S. Relation P stores for each person
registered with the NHS, his insurance number, his name, his ethnicity
group and his county. RelationsHN andHS store for each patient who
has been admitted to some hospital in the north or the south of UK, his
insurance number and the reason for being admitted to the hospital.
Relation O stores information related to patients in oncology depart-
ments and, in particular, their insurance numbers, their treatment
1https://www.nhs.uk/
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and their progress. Finally, relation S stores for each student in UK,
his insurance number, his name, his ethnicity group and his county.
Consider also the setV comprising the policy views V1–V4. The
policy views define the information that is safe to make available to
public. View V1 projects the ethnicity groups and the hospital admit-
tance reasons for patients in the north of UK; V2 projects the counties
and the hospital admittance reasons for patients in the north of UK;
V3 projects the treatments and the progress of patients of oncology
departments; V4 projects the ethnicity groups of the school students.
The policy views are safe w.r.t. the NSS privacy preservation protocol.
Indeed, the NSS privacy preservation protocol considers as unsafe any
non-evident piece of information that can potentially de-anonymize
an individual. For example, views V1 and V2 do not leak any sensi-
tive information, since the results concern patients from a very large
geographical area and, thus, the probability of de-anonymizing a
patient is significantly small. For similar reasons, views V3 and V4
are considered to be safe: the probability of de-anonymizing patients
of the oncology department from V3 is zero, since there is no way
to link a patient to his treatment or his progress, while V4 projects
information which is already evident to public.
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HN(i, d) ↔ V1(e, d) (1)
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HS(i, d) ↔ V2(c, d) (2)
O(i, t, p) ↔ V3(t, p) (3)
S(i, n, e, c) ↔ V4(e) (4)
Finally, consider the following set of s-t dependencies Σst . The
dependencies µe and µc project similar information with the views
V1 and V2, respectively. They focus, however, on patients in the north
of UK. Finally, the dependency µs projects the ethnicity groups of
students who have been in some oncology department.
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HN(i, d) → EthDis(e, d) (µe )
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HN(i, d) → CountyDis(c, d) (µc )
S(i, n, e, c) ∧ O(i, t, p) → SO(e) (µs )
The questions addressed in our paper are the following ones: Are the
s-t dependencies safe w.r.t the policy views? Are there any formal
guarantees for privacy preservation in the context of policy views? If
the s-t dependencies are not safe w.r.t. the policy views, how could we
repair them and provide formal privacy preservation guarantees?
Our technique is inherently data-independent thus bringing the
advantage that both the safety test and the repairing operations
are executed on the metadata provided through the mappings and
not on the underlying data instances. The logical foundations of
information disclosure in ontology-based data integration have
been laid in [3] in the presence of boolean policies. Instead, we
focus on non-boolean policies. Taking a step forward, we also pro-
pose an algorithm for repairing a set of unsafe s-t tgds w.r.t. our
privacy preservation protocol. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first to provide practical algorithms for a logical privacy-
preservation paradigm, described as an open research challenge in
[3, 13]. We leave out probabilistic approaches and anonymization
techniques [12, 16], which involve modifications of the underly-
ing data instances and are orthogonal to our approach. A careful
treatment of related work is deferred to Section 2.
The source code and the experimental scenarios are publicly
available at https://github.com/ucomignani/MapRepair.git.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
work. Section 3 presents the basic concepts and notions. Section 4
lays our privacy preservation protocol. Section 5 presents our repair-
ing algorithms and their properties. mechanism. Section 6 outlines
the experimental results, while Section 7 concludes our paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Privacy in data integration Safety of secret queries formulated
against a global schema and adhering to the certain answers se-
mantics has been tackled in previous theoretical work [13]. They
define the optimal attack that characterizes a set of queries that an
attacker can issue to which no further queries can be added to infer
more information. They then define the privacy guarantees against
the optimal attack by considering the static and the dynamic case,
the latter corresponding to modifications of the schemas or the
GLAV mappings. The same definition of secret queries and privacy
setting is adopted in [3], which instead focuses on boolean con-
junctive queries as policy views and on the notion of safety with
respect to a given mapping. An ontology-based integration scenario
is assumed in which the target instance is produced via a set of
mappings starting from an underlying data source. Whereas they
study the complexity of the view compliance problem in both data-
dependent and data-independent setting, we focus on the latter
and extend it to non-boolean conjunctive queries as policy views.
We further consider multiple policy views altogether in the design
practical algorithm for checking the safety of schema mappings
and for repairing the mappings in order to resume safety in case of
violations.
Privacy in data publishing Data publishing accounts for the
settings in which a view exports or publishes the information of an
underlying data source. Privacy and information disclosure in data
publishing linger over the problem of avoiding the disclosure of the
content of the view under a confidential query. A probabilistic for-
mal analysis of the query-view security model has been presented
in [12], where they offer a complete treatment of the multi-party
collusion and the use of external adversarial knowledge. Access
control policies using cryptography are used in [12] to enforce the
authorization to an XML document. Our work differs from theirs
on both the considered setting, as well as the adopted techniques
and the adopted privacy protocol.
Controlled Query Evaluation Controlled Query Evaluation
is a confidentiality enforcement framework introduced in [15] and
refined in [7],[5] and [6], in which a policy declaratively specifies
sensitive information and confidentiality is enforced by a censor.
Provided a query as input, a censor verifies whether the query leads
to a violation of the policy and in case of a violation it returns a dis-
torted answer. It has been recently adopted in ontologies expressed
with Datalog-like rules and in lightweight Description Logics [11].
They assume that the policies are only known to database adminis-
trators and not to ordinary users and that the data has protected
access through a query interface. Our assumptions and setting are
quite different, since our multiple policy views are accessible to
every user and our goal is to render the s-t mappings safe with
respect to a set of policies via repairing and rewriting.
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Data privacy Previous work has addressed access control to
protect database instances at different levels of granularity [14], in
order to combine encrypted query processing and authorization
rules. Our work does not deal with these authorization methods, as
well as does not consider any concrete privacy or anonymization
algorithms operating on data instances, such as differential privacy
[8] and k-anonymity [16].
3 PRELIMINARIES
Let Const, Nulls, and Vars be mutually disjoint, infinite sets of
constant values, labeled nulls, and variables, respectively. A schema
is a set of relation names (or just relations), each associated with
a nonnegative integer called arity. A relational atom has the form
R(®t) where R is an n-ary relation and ®t is an n-tuple of terms, where
a term is either a constant, a labelled null, or a variable. An equality
atom has the form t1 = t2 where t1 and t2 are terms. An atom is
called ground or fact, when it does not contain any variables. A
position in an n-ary atom A is an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote by
A|i , the i-th term of A. An instance I is a set of relational facts. An
atom (resp. an instance) is null-free if it does not contain labelled
nulls. The critical instance of a schema S, denoted as CrtS, is the
instance containing a fact of the form R(®∗), for each n-ary relation
R ∈ S, where ∗ is called the critical constant and ®∗ is an n-ary vector.
A substitution σ is a mapping from variables into constants or
labelled nulls.
A dependency describes the semantic relationship between re-
lations. A Tuple Generating Dependency (tgd) is a formula of the
form ∀®x λ(®x) → ∃®y ρ(®x , ®y), where λ(®x) and ρ(®x , ®y) are conjunctions
of relational, null-free atoms. An Equality Generating Dependency
(egd) is a formula of the form ∀®x λ(®x) → xi = x j , where λ(®x) is
a conjunction of relational, null-free atoms. We usually omit the
quantification for brevity. We refer to the left-hand side of a tgd
or an egd δ as the body, denoted as body(δ ), and to the right-hand
side as the head, denoted as head(δ ). An instance I satisfies a de-
pendency δ , written I |= δ if each homomorphism from body(δ )
into I can be extended to a homomorphism h′ from head(δ ) into I .
An instance I satisfies a set of dependencies Σ, written as I |= Σ, if
I |= δ holds, for each δ ∈ Σ. The solutions of an instance I w.r.t. Σ
is the set of all instances J such that J ⊇ I and J |= Σ. A solution
is called universal if it can be homomorphically embedded to each
solution of I w.r.t. Σ.
A conjunctive query (CQ) is a formula of the form ∃®y ∧i Ai ,
where Ai are relational, null-free atoms. A CQ is boolean if it does
not contain any free variables. A substitution σ is an answer to a
CQ Q on an instance I if the domain of σ is the free variables of
Q , and if σ can be extended to a homomorphism from
∧
i Ai into I .
We denote by Q(I ), the answers to Q on I .
Given an instance I and a set of dependencies Σ, the chase iter-
atively computes a universal solution of I w.r.t. Σ [4, 10]. Starting
from I0 = I , at each iteration i , it computes a new instance Ii by
applying a tgd or an egd chase step:
tgd chase step. Consider an instance Ii , a tgd δ of the form
∀®x λ(®x) → ∃®y ρ(®x , ®y) and a homomorphism h from λ(®x) into Ii ,
such that there does not exist an extension of h to a homomorphism
from ρ(®x , ®y) into Ii . Such homomorphisms are called active triggers.
Applying the tgd chase step for δ and h to Ii results in a new
instance Ii+1 = Ii ∪ h′(ρ(®x , ®y)), where h′ is a substitution such that
h′(x j ) = h(x j ) for each variable x j ∈ ®x , and h′(yj ), for each yj ∈ ®y,
is a fresh labeled null not occurring in Ii .
egd chase step. Consider an instance Ii , an egd δ of the form
∀®x λ(®x) → xi = x j and a homomorphism h from λ(®x) into Ii , such
that h(xi ) , h(x j ). Applying the egd chase step for δ and h to Ii
fails if {h(xi ),h(x j )} ⊆ Const, and otherwise it results in a new
instance Ii+1 = ν (Ii ), where ν = {h(x j ) 7→ h(xi )} if h(xi ) ∈ Const,
andν = {h(xi ) 7→ h(x j )} ifh(xi ) < Const. We denote by chase(I , Σ),
the chase of I w.r.t. Σ.
Let S be a source schema and let T be a target schema. Amapping
M from S to T is defined as a triple (S, T, Σ), where, generally,
Σ = Σs ∪ Σst ∪ Σt . Σs , Σst and Σt denote the source, s-t and target
dependencies over S and T, respectively. We usually refer to the
dependencies in Σst asmappings. A variable x of a mapping µ ∈ Σst
is called exported if it occurs both in the body and the head of µ.
We denote by exported(µ), the set of exported variables of µ. The
inverse of set of s-t dependencies Σst , denoted as Σ−1st is the set
consisting, for each mapping µ in Σst of the form λ(®x) → ρ(®x , ®y),
a mapping µ−1 of the form ρ(®x , ®y) → λ(®x). In this paper, we will
focus on the scenario, where Σs and Σt are empty, so Σwill be equal
to Σst . Furthermore, in this paper we focus on GLAV mappings,
i.e., s-t dependencies corresponding to a set of views.
The certain answers of a CQ Q over T w.r.t I andM, denoted as
certain(Q, I ,M), are the intersection of all answers to Q over all
solutions of I w.r.t. Σ. Given a finite, null-free instance I of the source
schema, the objective of data exchange is to compute a universal
solution of I w.r.t. the dependencies Σ fromM.
4 PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In this section, we introduce our notion of privacy preservation. Let
V be a set of policy views over S. The policy views represent the
information that is safe to expose for instances I of S. We denote
byMV = (S,V,V) the mapping from S to V, where V denotes the
schema of the views occurring inV . Our goal is to verify whether
a user-defined mappingM = (S, T, Σ) is safe w.r.t. a view mapping
MV. Below, we will introduce a notion for assessing the safety of a
GAV mappingM2 with respect to a GAV mappingM1, when both
make use of the same source schema S. Below, let Σi = Σsti be the
dependencies associated withMi .
4.1 A formal privacy-preservation protocol
Our notion of privacy preservation builds upon the protocol intro-
duced in [3]. Below, we formalize the notion of privacy preservation
from [3] and we extend it for non-boolean conjunctive queries. First
we recapitulate the notion of indistinguishability of two source in-
stances.
Definition 1. Two instances I and I ′ of a source schema S are
indistinguishable with respect to a mappingM = (S, T, Σ), denoted
as I ≡M I ′, if certain(Q, I ,M) = certain(Q, I ′,M) for each CQ Q
over T. □
Informally, Definition 1 tells us that two source instances are
indistinguishable from each other if the target instances have the
same certain answers.
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Definition 2. A mapping M = (S, T, Σ) does not disclose a CQ p
over S on any instance of S, if for each instance I of S there exists
an instance I ′ such that I ≡M I ′ and p(I ′) = ∅. □
The problem of checking whether a mapping M over S does
not disclose a boolean and constants-free CQ p on any instance
of S is decidable for GAV mappings consisting of CQ views [3]. In
particular,M does not disclose p on any instance of S if and only
if there does not exist a homomorphism from p into the unique
instance computed by the visible chase visChaseS(Σ) of Σ under the
critical instance CrtS of S. The visible chase computes a universal
source instance– that is an instance, such that the visible part of any
instance of S (i.e., the subinstance that becomes available through
the mappings) can be mapped into it. The only constant occurring
in the instance computed by visChaseS(Σ) is the critical constant ∗
and it represents any other constant that can occur in the source
instance.
For the purpose of repairing the mappings efficiently, we intro-
duce our own variant of the visible chase, which organizes the
facts derived during chasing into subinstances called bags. Algo-
rithm 1 describes the steps of the proposed variant. Please note
that Algorithm 1 derives the same set of facts with the algorithm
from [3]. However, instead of keeping these facts in a single set, we
keep them in separate bags. Before presenting Algorithm 1, we will
introduce some new notions.
Definition 3. Consider an instance I . Consider also a s-t tgd δ and
a homomorphism h from body(δ ) into I , such that h(x) ∈ Nulls, for
some x ∈ exported(δ ). Then, we say that the egd
body(δ ) →
∧
∀x ∈exported(δ ):h(x )∈Nulls
x = ∗ (5)
is derived from δ in I . For an egd ϵ that is derived from a s-t tgd δ
in I , tgd(ϵ) denotes δ . For a set of s-t tgds Σ and an instance I , Σ≈
is the set comprising for each δ ∈ Σ, the egd that is derived from δ
in I . □
Definition 4. Consider an instance I , whose facts are organized
into the bags β1, . . . , βm . Consider also a derived egd δ of the form
(5) and an active trigger h for δ in I . A bag βi is relevant for δ and h
in I , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, if some fact F ∈ h(body(δ )) occurs in βi and
if someh(x) is a labeled null occurring in βi , where x ∈ exported(δ ).
Let βj1 , . . . , βjk ⊆ β1, . . . , βm be the set of bags that are rele-
vant for δ and h in I . Let ν = {h(x j ) 7→ h(xi )} if h(xi ) = ∗, and
ν = {h(xi ) 7→ h(x j )} if h(xi ) < Const, where xi ,x j are variables
from exported(δ ). Then, the derived bag β for δ and h in I con-
sists of the facts in
⋃k
l=1 ν (βjl ). The bags βj1 , . . . , βjk are called the
predecessors of β . We use βjl ≺ β to denote that βjl is a predecessor
of β , for 1 ≤ l ≤ k . □
We are now ready to proceed with the description of Algorithm 1.
Given a s-t mapping, Algorithm 1 computes a universal source
instance whose facts are organized into bags. Algorithm 1 first
computes the instance I0 by chasing CrtS using the s-t tgds, line 1.
It then chases I0 with the inverse s-t tgds Σ−1, line 2. and proceeds
by chasing I1 with the set of all derived egds Σ≈, for each δ ∈ Σ in
I1, line 4. Algorithm 1 computes a fresh bag at each chase step. In
particular, for each active trigger h for δ in I , Algorithm 1 adds a
fresh bag with facts h′(head(δ )), if δ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ−1, line 9; otherwise, if
δ ∈ Σ≈, then it adds the derived bag for δ andh in I , see Definition 4,
line 20.
Note that, Σ≈ aims at “disambiguating” as many labeled nulls oc-
curring in I1 as possible, by unifying them with the critical constant
∗. Since ∗ represents the information that is “visible" to a third-
party, chasing with Σ≈ computes themaximal information from the
source instance a third-party has access to. Note that Algorithm 1
always terminates [3]. Let B = visChaseS(Σ). We will denote by
IS(Σ), the instance
⋃
β ∈B β .
Algorithm 1 visChaseS(Σ)
1: B0 ··= bagChaseTGDs(Σ, CrtS)
2: B1 ··= bagChaseTGDs(Σ−1, ⋃β∈B0 β \ CrtS)
3: Let Σ≈ be the set of all derived egds Σ≈ , for each δ ∈ Σ in I1
4: return bagChaseEGDs(Σ≈, B0 ∪ B1)
5: procedure bagChaseTGDs(Σ, I )
6: B ··= ∅
7: for each δ ∈ Σ do
8: for each active trigger h : body(δ ) → I do
9: create a fresh bag β with facts h′(head(δ ))
10: add β to B
11: return B
12: procedure bagChaseEGDs(Σ≈, B)
13: i ··= 0; Ii ··= ⋃β∈B β
14: do
15: i ··= i + 1
16: for each (δ ∈ Σ≈ of the form (5) do
17: for each active trigger h : body(δ ) → Ii−1 do
18: if h(x ) , ∗, for some x ∈ exported(δ ) then
19: Let β be the derived bag for δ and h in Ii−1
20: add β to B
21: Ii ··= Ii ∪ β
22: while Ii−1 , Ii
23: return B
Example 2. We demonstrate the visible chase algorithm over the
policy views and the s-t dependencies from Example (1).
We first present the computation of IS(V) =
⋃
β ∈visChaseS(V) β .
The critical instance CrtS of S consists of the facts shown in Eq. (6).
P(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) HN(∗, ∗) HS(∗, ∗) (6)
O(∗, ∗, ∗) S(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗)
where ∗ is the critical constant.
The instance I1 computed by chasing the output of line 1 using
V−1 will consist of the facts
P(ni, nn, ∗, nc) HN(ni, ∗) O(n′′i , ∗, ∗) (I1)
P(n′i , n′n, ne, ∗) HS(n′i , ∗) S(n′′′i , n′′′n , ∗, n′′′c )
where the constants prefixed by n are labeled nulls created while
chasing CrtS with the inverse mappings. Since there exists no homo-
morphism from the body of any s-t tgd into I1 mapping an exported
variable into a labeled null, Σ≈ will be empty, see Definition 3. Thus,
IS(V) = I1.
We next present the computation of IS(Σst ) =
⋃
β ∈visChaseS(Σst ) β .
The instance I ′1 computed by chasing the output of line 1 by Σ
−1
st will
consist of the facts
P(ni, nn, ∗, nc) HN(ni, ∗) S(n′′i , n′′n , ∗, n′c) (I ′1)
P(n′i , n′n, ne, ∗) HN(n′i , ∗) O(n′′i , n′′t , n′′p )
Since there exists a homomorphism from the body of µe into I ′1 map-
ping the exported variable e into the labeled null ne, and since there
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exists another homomorphism from the body of µc into I ′1 mapping
the exported variable c into the labeled null nc, Σ≈ will comprise the
egds ϵ1 and ϵ2 shown below
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HN(i, d) → e ≈ ∗ (ϵ1)
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HN(i, d) → c ≈ ∗ (ϵ2)
The last step of the visible chase involves chasing I ′1 using Σ≈. WLOG,
assume that the chase considers first ϵ1 and then ϵ2. During the first
step of the chase, there exists a homomorphism from body(ϵ1) into
I ′1. Hence, ne = ∗. During the second step of the chase, there exists a
homomorphism from body(ϵ2) into I ′1 and, hence, nc = ∗. The instance
computed at the end of the second round of the chase will consist of
the facts
P(ni, nn, ∗, ∗) HN(ni, ∗) HN(n′i , ∗) (7)
S(n′′i , n′′n , ∗, n′c) O(n′′i , n′′t , n′′p )
Since there exists no active trigger for ϵ1 or ϵ2 in the instance of Eq. (7),
the chase will terminate.
The facts in IS(Σst )will be organized into the following bags β1–β5
(one bag per line)
SO(e) ⟨µ
−1
s ,h1 ⟩−−−−−−−→ S(n′′i , n′′n , ∗, n′c),O(n′′i , n′′t , n′′p )
CountyDis(c, d) ⟨µ
−1
c ,h2 ⟩−−−−−−−→ P(n′i , n′n, ne, ∗),HN(n′i , ∗)
EthDis(e, d) ⟨µ
−1
e ,h3 ⟩−−−−−−−→ P(ni, nn, ∗, nc),HN(ni, ∗)
P(n′i , n′n, ne, ∗),HN(n′i , ∗)
⟨ϵ1,h4 ⟩−−−−−−→ P(n′i , n′n, ∗, ∗),HN(n′i , ∗)
P(ni, nn, ∗, nc),HN(ni, ∗)
⟨ϵ2,h5 ⟩−−−−−−→ P(ni, nn, ∗, ∗),HN(ni, ∗)
h1 = {i 7→ n′i , n 7→ n′n, e 7→ ne, c 7→ ∗, d 7→ ∗}
h2 = {c 7→ ∗, d 7→ ∗}
h3 = {e 7→ ∗, d 7→ ∗}
h4 = {i 7→ n′i , n 7→ n′n, e 7→ ne, c 7→ ∗, d 7→ ∗}
h5 = {i 7→ ni, n 7→ nn, e 7→ ∗, c 7→ nc, d 7→ ∗}
The contents of the bags correspond to the right-hand side of the
arrows. However, for presentation purposes, we also show the related
dependency δ and the homomorphism h that lead to the derivation
of each bag (shown at the top of each arrow), as well as, the facts in
h(body(δ )) (left-hand side of each arrow).
4.2 Preserving the privacy of policy views
We consider a mapping consisting of CQ viewsM = (S, T, Σ) to be
safe w.r.t. a view mapping consisting of CQ viewsMV = (S,V,V),
ifM does not disclose the information that is also not disclosed by
MV. Definition 5 and Theorem 1 presented below formalize our
notion of privacy preservation and show that there exists a simple
process for verifying whetherM is safe w.r.t.MV.
Definition 5. A mapping M2 = (S, T2, Σ2) preserves the privacy
of a mapping M1 = (S, T1, Σ1) on all instances of S, if for each
constants-free CQ p over S, if p is not disclosed by M1 on any
instance of S, then p is not disclosed by M2 on any instance of
S. □
Theorem 1. A mapping M2 = (S, T2, Σ2) preserves the privacy
of a mappingM1 = (S, T1, Σ1) on all instances of S, if and only if
there exists a homomorphism h from IS(Σ2) into IS(Σ1), such that
h(∗) = ∗. □
Proof. (Sketch) First we show that the following holds
Lemma 1. A mappingM = (S, T, Σ) does not disclose a constants-
free CQ p over S on any instance of S, iff ®∗ < p(J ), where J = IS(Σst ).
Proof. By adapting the proof technique of Theorem 16 from
[3], we can show that J = IS(Σst ) is a universal source instance
IS(Σ) satisfying the following property: for each pair of source
instances I and I ′, such that I ′ is indistinguishable from I w.r.t. the
mapping M, there exists a homomorphism h from I ′ into IS(Σ)
mapping each schema constant into the critical constant ∗. Due
to the existence of a homomorphism h from I ′ into IS(Σ), for each
pair of indistinguishable source instances I and I ′, we can see that
if ®∗ < p(J ) for a constants-free CQ p, then p(I ′) = ∅. Due to the
above and due to Definition 2, it follows that M = (S, T, Σ) does
not disclose a constants-free CQ p over S on any instance of S. □
Lemma 1 states that, in order to check if a constants-free CQ
is safe according to Definition 2, we need to check if the critical
tuple is among the answers to p over the instance computed by
visChaseS(Σ). Next, we show the following lemma.
Lemma2. Given two instances I1 and I2, the following are equivalent
(1) for each CQ p, if ®u ∈ p(I1), then ®u ∈ p(I2), where ®u is a vector
of constants
(2) there exists a homomorphism from I1 to I2 preserving the con-
stants of I1
Proof of Lemma 2. (2)⇒(1). Suppose that there exists a homo-
morphism h from I1 to I2 preserving the constants of I1. Suppose
also that ®u ∈ p(I1), with p being a CQ. This means that there exists
a homomorphism h1 from p into I1 mapping each free variable
xi of p into ui , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n is the number of free
variables of p. Since the composition of two homomorphisms is a
homomorphism and since h preserves the constants of I1 due to
the base assumptions, this means that h ◦ h1 is a homomorphism
from p into I2 mapping each free variable xi of p into ti , for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n. This completes this part of the proof.
(1)⇒(2). Let p1 be a CQ formed by creating a non-ground atom
R(y1, . . . ,yn ) for each ground atom R(u1, . . . ,un ) ∈ I1, by taking
the conjunction of these non-ground atoms and by converting into
an existentially quantified variable every variable created out of
some labelled null. Let ®x denote the free variables of p1 and let
n = | ®x |. From the above, it follows that there exists a homomor-
phism h1 from p1 into I1 mapping each xi ∈ ®x into some constant
occurring in I1. Let ®u ∈ p1(I1). From (1), it follows that ®u ∈ p1(I2)
and, hence, there exists a homomorphism h2 from p1 into I2 map-
ping each xi ∈ ®x intoui , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since h1 ranges over all
constants of I1 and since h1(xi ) = h2(xi ) holds for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it
follows that there exists a homomorphism from I1 to I2 preserving
the constants of I1. This completes the second part of the proof. □
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Lemma 2 can be restated as follows
Lemma3. Given two instances I1 and I2, the following are equivalent
(1) for each CQ p, if ®t < p(I2), then ®t < p(I1)
(2) there exists a homomorphism from I1 to I2
We are now ready to return to the main part of the proof. Given
a CQ p over a source schema S, and a mappingM defined as the
triple (S, T, Σ), where T is a target schema and Σ is a set of s-t
dependencies, we know from Proposition 1 that if M discloses
p on some instance of S, then there exists a homomorphism of p
into visChaseS(Σ) mapping the free variables of p into the critical
constant ∗.
From the above, we know thatM2 does not preserve the privacy
of M1 if there exists a CQ p over S, such that ®∗ < J1 and ®∗ ∈ J2,
where J1 = IS(Σ1) and J2 = IS(Σ2). We will now prove that M2
preserves the privacy ofM1 iff there exists a homomorphism from
J2 into J1 that preserves the critical constant ∗. This will be referred
to as conjecture (C).
(⇒) If M2 preserves the privacy of M1, then for each CQ p,
if ®∗ < p(J1), then ®∗ < p(J2). From the above and from Lemma 3, it
follows that there exists a homomorphism ϕ : J2 → J1, such that
ϕ(∗) = ∗.
(⇐) The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume that there
exists a homomorphism h from J2 into J1 preserving ∗, butM2 does
not preserve the privacy ofM1. We will refer to this assumption as
assumption (A1). From assumption (A1) and the discussion above
it follows that there exists a CQ p over S such that ®∗ < p(J1) and
®∗ ∈ p(J2). Let h2 be the homomorphism from p into J2 mapping its
free variables into ∗. Since the composition of two homomorphisms
is a homomorphism, this means that h ◦ h2 is a homomorphism
from p into J1 mapping its free variables into ∗, i.e., ®∗ ∈ p(J1). This
contradicts our original assumption and hence concludes the proof
of conjecture (C). Conjecture (C) witnesses the decidability of the
instance-independent privacy preservation problem: in order to
verify whetherM2 preserves the privacy ofM1 we only need to
check if there exists a homomorphism ϕ : IS(Σ2) → IS(Σ1), such
that ϕ(∗) = ∗. □
Theorem 1 states that in order to verify whetherM2 is safe w.r.t.
M1, we need to compute IS(Σ1) and IS(Σ2) and check if there exists
a homomorphism from the second instance into the first one that
maps ∗ into itself. If there exists such a homomorphism, we say
that IS(Σ1) is safe w.r.t. IS(Σ2), or simply safe, and we say that it is
unsafe otherwise.
Example 3. Continuing with Example 1, we can see that the s-t
tgds are not safe w.r.t. the policy views according to Theorem 1, since
there does not exist a homomorphism from the instance IS(Σst ) into
the instance IS(V). This means that there exists information which
is disclosed by Σst in some instance that satisfies Σst , but it is not
disclosed byV . Indeed, from S(n′′i , n′′n , ∗, n′c) and O(n′′i , n′′t , n′′p ), we
can see that we can potentially leak the identity of a student who
has been to an oncology department. This can happen if there exists
only one student in the school coming from a specific ethnicity group
and this ethnicity group is returned by µs . Please note that the policy
views are safe w.r.t. this leak. Indeed, it is impossible to derive this
information through reasoning over the returned tuples under the
input instance and the views V3 and V4.
Algorithm 2 repair(Σ,V, prf,n)
1: Σ1 ··= frepair(Σ, V, prf)
2: Σ2 ··= srepair(Σ1, V, prf, n)
3: return Σ2
Furthermore, by looking at the facts P(ni, nn, ∗, ∗) and HN(ni, ∗),
we can see that we can potentially leak the identity and the disease
of a patient who has been admitted to some hospital in the north of
UK. This can happen if there exists only one patient who relates to
the county and the ethnicity group returned by µe and µc . Note that
the policy views V1 and V2 do not leak this information, since it is
impossible to obtain the county and the ethnicity group of an NHS
patient at the same time.
5 REPAIRING UNSAFE MAPPINGS
In Section 4 we presented our privacy preservation protocol and
a technique for verifying whether a mapping is safe w.r.t. another
one, over all source instances. This section presents an algorithm
for repairing an unsafe mappingM w.r.t. a set of policy viewsV .
Algorithm 2 summarizes the steps of the proposed algorithm.
The inputs to it are, apart from Σ andV , a positive integer n which
will be used during the second step of the repairing process and a
preference mechanism prf for ranking the possible repairs. In the
simplest scenario, the preference mechanism implements a fixed
function for ranking the different repairs. However, it can also
employ supervised learning techniques in order to progressively
learn the user preferences by looking at his prior decisions.
Since a mappingM is safe w.r.t.V if the instance IS(Σ) is safe
according to Theorem 1, Algorithm 2 rewrites the tgds inM, such
that the derived visible chase instances are safe. The rewriting takes
place in two steps. The first step rewrites Σ into a partially-safe set
of s-t dependencies Σ1, while the second step rewrites the output
of the first one into a new set of s-t dependencies Σ2, such that
IS(Σ2) is safe. As we will explain later on, partial-safety ensures
that the intermediate instance I1 produced by visChaseS(Σ1) at
line 2 of Algorithm 1 is safe, but it does not provide strong privacy
guarantees. The benefit of this two-step approach is that it allows
repairing one or a small set of dependencies at a time.
5.1 Computing partially-safe mappings
Since the problem of safety is reduced to the problem of checking
for a homomorphism from IS(Σ) into IS(V), a first test towards
checking for such a homomorphism is to look if the mappings in
Σ would lead to such a homomorphism or not. For instance, by
looking at µs in Example 1 it is easy to see that it leaks sensitive
information, since it involves a join between students and oncology
departments, which does not occur in IS(V).
Definition 6. A mappingM = (S, T, Σ) is partially-safe w.r.t.
MV = (S,V,V) on all instances of S, if there exists a homomor-
phism from chase(Σ−1,CrtT) \ CrtT into IS(V). □
From Algorithm 1, it follows that Σ is partially-safe iff the inter-
mediate instance I1 computed by visChaseS(Σ) is safe.
Proposition 1. A mapping M = (S, T, Σ) is partially-safe w.r.t.
MV = (S,V,V) on all instances of S, if for each µ ∈ Σ, there exists a
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homomorphism from body(µ) into IS(V)mapping eachx ∈ exported(µ)
into the critical constant ∗. □
Note that according to Proposition 1, in our running example
Σst would be partially-safe, if µs < Σst , then since there exist
homomorphisms from the bodies of µs and µc into IS(V), mapping
their exported variables into ∗. It is also easy to show the following
Remark 1. A mappingM = (S, T, Σ) is safe w.r.t.MV = (S,V,V)
on all instances of S, only if it is partially-safe w.r.t. MV on all
instances of S. □
Proposition 1 presents a quite convenient, yet somewhat ex-
pected, finding: in order to obtain a partially-safe mapping, it suf-
fices to repair each s-t dependency independently of the others. Fur-
thermore, the repair of each µ ∈ Σ involves breaking joins and
hiding exported variables, such that the repaired dependency µr
satisfies the criterion in Proposition 1.
We make use of the result of Proposition 1 in Algorithm 3. Al-
gorithm 3 obtains, for each µ ∈ Σ, a set of rewritings Rµ , out of
which we will choose the best rewriting according to prf. The set
Rµ consists of all rewritings that differ from µ w.r.t. the variable
repetitions in the bodies of the rules and the exported variables. For
performance reasons, we do not examine rewritings that introduce
atoms in the bodies of the rules. However, this does not compromise
the completeness of Algorithm 2 as we show at end of this section.
Below, we present the steps of Algorithm 3.
For each s-t tgd µ and for each atom B ∈ body(µ), Algorithm 3
constructs a fresh atomC and addsC to a set C. The set of atoms C
provides us with the means to identify all repairs of µ that involve
breaking joins and hiding exported variables. In particular, each
homomorphism ξ from C into IS(V) corresponds to one repair
of µ. In lines 12–25, Algorithm 3 modifies each atom B ∈ body(µ)
by taking into account prior body atom modifications. The prior
modifications are accumulated in the relation ρ and the mapping
ψ . The relation ρ keeps for each variable x from body(µ), the fresh
variables that were used to replace x during prior steps of the re-
pairing process, whileψ is a substitution from the partially repaired
body into IS(V). In particular, at the end of the i-th iteration of
the loop in line 12,ψ holds the substitution from the first repaired
i atoms from body(µ) into IS(V). We adopt this approach instead
of replacing variable x in position p always by a fresh variable, in
order to minimize the number of the joins we break.
Below, we describe how Algorithm 3 modifies each body atom
of µ, w.r.t. a homomorphism ξ , lines 9–27. LetC = ν (B) be the fresh
body atom that was constructed out of B in line 5. For each atom
B ∈ body(µ) and for each p ∈ pos(B), if the variable y in position
p of C is not mapped to the critical constant ∗ via ξ and B |p is a
exported variable, this means that the variable sitting in position p
of B should not be exported (see first condition in line 16). Similarly,
if the variable sitting in position p of B is mapped to a different
constant than the one that y maps via ξ , then this means that the
variable sitting in positionp of B introduces an unsafe join (see second
condition in line 16). In the presence of these violations, we must
replace variable x in position p of B, either by a variable that was
used in a prior step of the repairing process, line 17–18), or by a
fresh variable, lines 19–23. Otherwise, if there is no violation so
far, then we add the mapping {x 7→ ξ (y)} toψ , if it is not already
Algorithm 3 frepair(Σ,V, prf)
1: for each µ ∈ Σ do
2: ν ··= ∅, C ··= ∅
3: for each B ∈ body(µ), where B = R( ®x ) do
4: create a vector of fresh variables ®y
5: create the atomC = R( ®y)
6: add (B, C) to ν
7: addC to C
8: Rµ := ∅
9: for each homomorphism ξ : C → IS(V) do
10: ρ := ∅,ψ := ∅
11: µr := µ
12: for each B ∈ body(µr ) do
13: C = ν (B)
14: for each p ∈ pos(B) do
15: x = B |p , y = C |p
16: if x ∈ exported(µ) and ∗ , ξ (y) or x ∈ dom(ψ ) andψ (x ) , ξ (y) then
17: if ∃x ′ s.t. (x, x ′) ∈ ρ andψ (x ′) = ξ (y) then
18: B |p = x ′
19: else
20: create a fresh variable x ′
21: add (x, x ′) to ρ
22: add {x ′ 7→ ξ (y)} toψ
23: B |p = x ′
24: else if x < dom(ψ ) then
25: add {x 7→ ξ (y)} toψ
26: if µr , µ then
27: add µr to Rµ
28: if Rµ , ∅ then f
29: choose the best repair µr of µ from Rµ based on prf
30: remove µ from Σ
31: add µr to Σ
32: return Σ
there, lines 24–25. Finally, the algorithm chooses the best repair
according to the preference function, lines 28–31.
Example 4. We demonstrate an example of Algorithm 3.
Since Algorithm 3 focuses on IS(V) overlooking the actual views
inV , we will not explicitly defineV . Instead, we will only assume
that the visible chase computes the instance
IS(V) = {R1(∗, n1, n2), S1(n1, n2, n2), S1(n1, n3, ∗), S1(n1, ∗, ∗)}
where n1–n3 are labeled nulls. Consider also the mappingM consist-
ing of the following s-t dependency
R1(x ,y, z) ∧ S1(y, z, z) → T1(x , z) (µ1)
Note thatM is not partially-safe. Algorithm 3 computes two repairs
for µ1 by applying the steps described below. First, it computes the
atoms R1(x1,x2,x3) S1(x4,x5,x6) and adds them to C, lines 3–7.
Then, it identifies the following three homomorphisms from C into
IS(V):
ξ1 = {x1 7→ ∗,x2 7→ n1,x3 7→ n2,x4 7→ n1,x5 7→ n2,x6 7→ n2}
ξ2 = {x1 7→ ∗,x2 7→ n1,x3 7→ n2,x4 7→ n1,x5 7→ n3,x6 7→ ∗}
ξ3 = {x1 7→ ∗,x2 7→ n1,x3 7→ n2,x4 7→ n1,x5 7→ ∗,x6 7→ ∗}
From ξ1, we can see that the joins in the body of µ1 are safe; however,
it is unsafe to export z. From ξ2, we can see that is safe to reveal
the third position of S1; however, it is unsafe to join the second and
the third position of S1. Algorithm 3 then iterates over ξ1 and ξ2,
line 9. When B = R1(x ,y, z) and p < 3, Algorithm 3 computes ψ to
{x 7→ ∗,y 7→ n1}, since there is no violation according to line 16.
When B = R1(x ,y, z) and p = 3, however, a violation is detected.
This is due to the facts that z is an exported variable and ξ (x3) = n2.
Algorithm 3 tackles this violation by creating a fresh variable z1.
Then, it adds the relation (z, z1) to ρ, replaces z in B |3 by z1 and
adds the mapping {z1 7→ n2} to ψ , lines 19–23. Algorithm 3 then
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considers S1(y, z, z). When p = 1, no violation is encountered, since
ψ (y) = ξ1(x4). However, when p = 2, a homomorphism violation is
encountered, since z is an exported variable and since ξ (x3) = n2.
Since (z, z1) ∈ ρ and ψ (z1) = ξ1(x5), Algorithm 3 replaces z in the
second position of S1(y, z, z) by z1, line 19. By applying a similar
reasoning, we can see that the variable z siting in S1(y, z, z)|3 is also
replaced by z1. Hence, the first repair of µ is
R1(x ,y, z1) ∧ S1(y, z1, z1) → T1(x) (r1)
Algorithm 3, then proceeds by repairing µ1 based on ξ2. When
B = R1(x ,y, z), Algorithm 3 proceeds as described above and computes
ψ to {x 7→ ∗,y 7→ n1, z1 7→ n2}. When B = S1(y, z, z) and p = 1,
then no violation is encountered since ψ (y) = ξ1(x4), while when
B = S1(y, z, z) and p = 2, there is a violation. Since the condition in
line 18 is not met, Algorithm 3 creates a fresh variable z2 and adds
the mapping {z2 7→ n3} toψ . When B = S1(y, z, z) and p = 3, then
no violation is met, since z ∈ exported(µ) and ξ2(x6) = ∗. Hence, the
second repair of µ1 is
R1(x ,y, z1) ∧ S1(y, z2, z) → T1(x , z) (r2)
Finally, we can see that the repair for µ1 w.r.t. ξ3 is
R1(x ,y, z1) ∧ S1(y, z, z) → T1(x , z) (r3)
Proposition 2. For any M = (S, T, Σ), any MV = (S,V,V) and
any preference function prf, Algorithm frepair returns a mapping
M ′ = (S, T, Σ′) that is partially-safe w.r.t. MV on all instances of
S. □
Proof. (Sketch) From Proposition 1, a mappingM = (S, T, Σ)
is partially-safe w.r.t. MV = (S,V,V) on all instances of S, if for
each µ ∈ Σ, there exists a homomorphism from body(µ) into IS(V)
mapping each x ∈ exported(µ) into the critical constant ∗. Since for
each µ ∈ Σ frepair computes a set of repaired tgds Rµ , it follows
that Proposition 2 holds, if such a homomorphism exists, for each
repaired tgd in Rµ . The proof proceeds as follows. Let µir and ψ i
denote the repaired s-t tgd and the homomorphismψ computed at
the end of each iteration i of the steps in lines 12–25 of Algorithm 3.
Let also Bi denote the i-th atom in body(µr ). Since eachC ∈ C is an
atom of distinct fresh variables, since ξ is a homomorphism from
C to IS(V) and sinceψ (Bi ) = µr |i , it follows that in order to prove
Proposition 1, we have to show that the following claim holds, for
each i ≥ 0:
• ϕ.ψ i is a homomorphism from the first i atoms in the body
of µr into IS(V) mapping each exported variable occurring
in B0, . . . ,Bi into the critical constant ∗.
For i = 0, ϕ trivially holds. For i + 1 and assuming that ϕ holds for i
let Ci+1 = ν (Bi+1), line 13. The proof of claim ϕ depends upon the
proof of the following claim, for each iteration p ≥ 0 of the steps in
lines 14–25:
• θ .ψ i+1(Bi+1 |p ) = ξ (y), where y = Ci+1 |p .
The claim θ trivially holds for p = 0, while for p > 0, it directly
follows from the steps in lines 16–25. Since ϕ holds for i , since the
steps in lines 16–25 do not modify the variable mappings inψ i and
due to θ , it follows that ϕ holds for i + 1, concluding the proof of
Proposition 1. □
5.2 Computing safe mappings
Unifications of one or more labeled nulls occurring in I1 with the
critical constant ∗, might lead to unsafe instances. Consider, for
instance, a simplified variant of Example 1, where Σst comprises
only µe and µc . Both µe and µc are partially-safe, as we have ex-
plained above. However, the unification of the labeled nulls nn and
nc produces an unsafe instance. Algorithm 4 aims at repairing the
output of the previous step, such that no unsafe unification of a
labeled null with ∗ takes place.
Consider again the simplified variant of Σst from above. Since
Σst is partially-safe, it suffices to look for homomorphism violations
in Ii , for i ≥ 1. A first observation is that the homomorphism viola-
tions are “sitting" within the bags. This is due to the fact that each
bag stores all the facts associated with the bodies of one or more s-t
tgds from Σst . A second observation is that one way for preventing
unsafe unifications is to hide exported variables. For example, let us
focus on the unsafe unification of ne with ∗. This unification takes
place due to ϵ1, which in turn has been created due to the fact that
e is an exported variable in µe . By hiding the exported variable e
from µe , we actually prevent the creation of ϵ1 and hence, we block
the unsafe unification of e with ∗. Hiding exported variables is one
way for preventing unsafe unifications with the critical constant.
Another way for preventing unsafe unifications is to break joins in
the bodies of the rules.
Example 5. This example demonstrates a second approach for
preventing unsafe labeled null unifications.
Consider a set of policy viewsV leading to the following instance
IS(V) = {R1(n1, n1, ∗),R1(∗, ∗, n2), S1(∗)}, where n1 and n2 are la-
belled nulls. Consider also the mappingM consisting of the following
s-t dependencies:
R1(x ,x ,y) ∧ S1(y) → T1(y) (µ2)
R1(x ,x ,y) → T2(x) (µ3)
It is easy to see thatM is partially-safe, but unsafe in overall. Indeed,
IS(Σ) will consist of the following bags (for presentation purposes, we
adopt the notation from Example 2):
T1(∗)
⟨µ−12 ,θ1 ⟩−−−−−−−→ R1(n3, n3, ∗), S1(∗)
T2(∗)
⟨µ−13 ,θ2 ⟩−−−−−−−→ R1(∗, ∗, n4)
R1(n3, n3, ∗), S1(∗)
⟨ϵ3,θ3 ⟩−−−−−−→ R1(∗, ∗, ∗), S1(∗)
where ϵ3 ··= R1(x ,x ,y) → x = ∗, θ1 = {y 7→ ∗}, θ2 = {x 7→ ∗} and
θ3 = {x 7→ n3,y 7→ ∗}. Note that ϵ3 has been created out of µ3, since
there exists a homomorphism from body(µ3) into R1(n3, n3, ∗) map-
ping the exported variable x into n3.
One approach for preventing the unsafe unification of n3 with ∗ is
to hide the exported variable x from µ3. By doing this, we block the
creation of ε , and hence the unsafe unification.
A second approach is to keep x as an exported variable in µ3, but
modify the body of µ2 by breaking the join between the first and the
second position of R1
R1(x , z,y) ∧ S1(y) → T1(y) (µ ′2)
By doing this, we prevent the creation of ε , since the instance com-
puted at line 2 of Algorithm 1 would consist of the facts R1(n3, n5, ∗),
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R1(∗, ∗, n4), S1(∗) and, hence, there would be no homomorphism from
body(µ3) into it. Note that the modification of µ2 to µ ′2 is safe. In-
tuitively, this holds, since we break joins, and thus, we export less
information.
Before presenting Algorithm 4, we will introduce some new no-
tation. The depth of each bag β , denoted as depth(β), coincides with
the highest derivation depth of the facts in β . The support of a bag
β , denoted as β≺ , is inductively defined as follows: if depth(β) = 1,
then β≺ = β ; otherwise, if depth(β) > 1, then ∪β ′≺β β ′≺ . Consider
an active trigger h for δ in I leading to the creation of a bag β .
We use the following notation: dependency(β) = δ , trigger(β) = h
and premise(β) = h(body(δ )). Two bags β1 and β2 are candidates
formodifyBody if β1 ≺ β2, depth(β1) = 1, depth(β2) = 2 and there
exists at least one repeated variable in the body of tgd(β1).
Algorithm 4 presents an iterative process for repairing a partially-
safe Σ, by employing the three ideas we described above: checking
for homomorphism violations within each bag and preventing un-
safe unifications either by hiding exported variable, or by modifying
the bodies of the s-t tgds. In brief, at each iteration i ≥ 0, the algo-
rithm repairs one or more dependencies from Σi , where Σ0 = Σ,
and incrementally computes the visible chase of the new set of
dependencies, lines 4–25. Algorithm 4 terminates either when the
dependencies are safe, or when the maximum number of iterations
n is reached, line 25, in which case it repairs all unsafe dependen-
cies by hiding their exported variables. The algorithm starts by
initializing Σ0 to Σ, lines 1. Then, at each iteration i , it first iden-
tifies the lowest depth unsafe bag, line 7, and attempts to repair
the dependencies from Σi that lead to its creation, lines 7–22. If
i < n, it proposes two different repairs for Σi , one based on hiding
exported variables through hideExported (Algorithm 5), and the sec-
ond based on eliminating joins throughmodifyBody (Algorithm 6),
lines 10–19. Algorithm 4 applies the modifyBody if there exist two
bags in the support of β that are candidates for modifyBody. Infor-
mally, Algorithm 4 tries to apply modifyBody as early as possible
(condition depth(β1) = 1, depth(β2) = 2) and when there are one
or more repeated variables in the body of tgd(β1) (recall Example 5).
Otherwise, if i = n, it either applies the function hideExported, or it
eliminates the s-t tgds that are responsible for unsafe unifications.
Example 6. We demonstrate Algorithm 4 over a simplified ver-
sion of the running example, where Σ′st = {µe , µc }. It is see that
visChaseS(Σ′st ) will consist of the bags {β2, β3, β4, β5}. We assume
that n = ∞. During the first iteration of Algorithm 4, the lowest depth
bag for which there exists a homomorphism violation is β4. Since
i < n, the algorithm tries to repair Σ′st by calling hideExported and
modifyBody with arguments (apart fromV and prf) β4 and β2, β4,
respectively.
Algorithm 5 first computesν = {n′i 7→ x1, n′n 7→ x2, ne 7→ x3}, lines
3–4, and then computes all homomorphisms from
ν (J ) = {P(x1,x2,x3, ∗),HN(x1, ∗)}
into the instance IS(V), line 6. We can see that there exists only one
such homomorphism ξ = {x1 7→ n′i ,x2 7→ n′n,x3 7→ ne}. We have
tgd(β4) = µe . The first two iterations of the loop in lines 8–12 have
no effect, since despite that ξ (x1) = n′i and ξ (x2) = n′n, the variables i
and n from µe that are mapped to n′i and n
′
n via trigger(β4) = h4 are
not exported ones. During the last iteration, since ξ (x3) = ne, since
Algorithm 4 srepair(Σ,V, prf,n)
1: Σ0 ··= Σ
2: B0 ··= visChaseS(Σ)
3: i ··= 0
4: do
5: Σi+1 ··= Σi
6: cont ··= false
7: if ∃ unsafe β ∈ Bi , s.t. depth(β ) ≤ depth(β ′), ∀ unsafe bag β ′ ∈ Bi then
8: cont ··= true
9: if i < n then
10: r1 ··= ∅; r2 ··= hideExported(β, V, prf)
11: if ∃β1, β2 ∈ β≺ , s.t. β1, β2 are candidates formodifyBody then
12: r1 ··= modifyBody(tgd(β1), tgd(β2), prf)
13: if r1 , ∅ and it is preferred over r2 w.r.t. prf then
14: remove tgd(β1) from Σi+1
15: add r1 to Σi+1
16: else
17: remove tgd(β ) from Σi+1
18: add r2 to Σi+1
19: else
20: if ∄β ′, s.t., β ≺ β ′ ∈ Bi then
21: add hideExported(β, V, prf) to Σi+1
22: else remove tgd(β ) from Σi+1
23: compute Ji+1 from Σi , Σi+1 and Bi
24: i = i + 1
25: while cont and i ≤ n
26: return Σn
Algorithm 5 hideExported(β ,V, prf)
1: J := premise(β )
2: ν := ∅
3: for each n ∈ Nulls occurring into J do
4: add {n 7→ x } to ν , where x is a fresh variable
5: R := ∅
6: for each ξ : ν (J ) → IS(V) do
7: µ ··= tgd(β )
8: for each x ∈ dom(ξ ) do
9: if ξ (x ) , ∗ then
10: for each y ∈ exported(µ) do
11: if τ (y) = ν−1(x ), where τ = trigger(β ) then
12: remove y from exported(µ)
13: if µ , tgd(β ) then
14: add µ to R
15: choose the best repair µr of µ from R based on prf
16: return µr
Algorithm 6 modifyBody(µ1, µ2, prf)
1: R := ∅
2: if ∃ one or more repeated variables in body(µ1) then
3: for each ξ : body(µ2) → body(µ1) mapping some x1 ∈ exported(µ1)
into some x2 < exported(µ2) do
4: Let B ⊆ body(µ1), s.t. ξ (body(µ2)) = B
5: LetV be the set of repeated variables from B
6: Let P be the set of positions from B , where all variables fromV occur
7: for each non-empty S ⊂ P do
8: µ ··= µ1
9: replace the variables in positions S of µ by fresh variables
10: add µ to R
11: choose the best repair µr of µ from R based on prf
12: return µr
h4(e) = ne and since e is an exported variable, Algorithm 5 removes
variable e from the exported variables of µe and returns µ ′e
P(i, n, e, c) ∧ HN(i, d) ↔ EthDis(d) (µ ′e )
Algorithm 4 then callsmodifyBody. The function does not return any
repair, since there does not exist any variable repetition in the body of
µe . Hence, Algorithm 4 computes Σ1 = {µ ′e , µc } and proceeds in the
next iteration. The instance IS(Σ1) will consist of the following bags
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β ′2 and β
′
3 with their corresponding homomorphisms shown below:
CountyDis(c, d) ⟨µ
−1
c ,h
′
2 ⟩−−−−−−−→ P(n′i , n′n, ne, ∗),HN(n′i , ∗)
EthDis(d) ⟨µ
−1
e ,h
′
3 ⟩−−−−−−−→ P(ni, nn, n′e, nc),HN(ni, ∗)
h′2 = {c 7→ ∗, d 7→ ∗}
h′3 = {d 7→ ∗}
Algorithm 4 terminates, since all bags are safe.
Note that when we reach the maximum number of iterations we
do not apply modifyBody. This is due to the fact that modifyBody
might lead to unsafe unification of labeled nulls to ∗ that were not
taking place before the modifying the s-t tgd through modifyBody.
In contrast, hideExported is a safe modification, since it does not
lead to new unsafe unifications.
Theorem2. For any partially-safeM = (S, T, Σ), anyMV = (S,V,V),
any preference function prf and n ≥ 0, Algorithm srepair returns a
mappingM ′ = (S, T, Σ′) that preserves the privacy ofMV on all
instances of S. □
Proof. (Sketch) First note that since srepair takes as input a
partially-safe mappingM = (S, T, Σ), it follows from Definition 6
that there exists a homomorphism from chase(Σ−1,CrtT) \ CrtT
into IS(V). Furthermore, from Proposition 1, we know that for
each µ ∈ Σ, there exists a homomorphism from body(µ) into IS(V)
mapping each x ∈ exported(µ) into the critical constant ∗. Due to
the above, since the steps in lines 16–20 of Algorithm 1 do not
introduce new labeled nulls and since srepair applies the procedure
hideExported to each unsafe bag β in Bn , if there does not exist
a bag β ′ ∈ Bn , such that β ≺ β ′, it follows thatM ′ preserves the
privacy ofMV on all instances of S, if hideExported prevents dan-
gerous unifications of labeled nulls with the critical constant in
line 4 of Algorithm 1. In particular, assume that we are in the n-th
iteration of the steps in lines 4–25 of Algorithm 4. Let β0n , . . . , βMn
be the unsafe bags in Bn . Assume also that for each 1 ≤ l ≤ M , βln ,
was derived due to some active trigger hl , for some derived egd
εl ∈ Σ≈ in Ij , where j ≥ 0, line 17 of Algorithm 1. Let µl = tgd(εl ),
for each 0 ≤ l ≤ M and let µlr be the repaired s-t tgd. Finally, let
β0n+1, . . . , β
N
n+1 be the bags in Bn+1, line 23 of Algorithm 4. Based
on the above, in order to show that Theorem 2 holds, we need to
show that (i) the number of bags in Bn+1 is ≤ the number of bags in
Bn and that (ii) the s-t tgds in
(
Σ \⋃Ml=0 µl ) ∪⋃Ml=0 µlr are safe. In
order to show (i) and (ii), we consider the steps in Algorithm 5: for
each 1 ≤ l ≤ M , each exported variable y occurring in µl , which
leads to an unsafe unification, line 11 of Algorithm 5, is turned into
a non-exported variable. □
By combining Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 we can prove the
correctness of Algorithm 2. Furthermore, if the preference function
always prefers the repairs computed by hideExported from the
repairs computed by modifyBody, we can show the following:
Proposition 3. For eachmappingM = (S, T, Σ), eachMV = (S,V,V)
and each preference function prf that always prefers the repairs com-
puted by hideExported from the repairs computed by modifyBody,
min max step
# s-t tgds per scenario (ndep ) 100 300 50
# body atom per s-t tgds (natoms ) 1 3 (5) −
# exported variables per s-t tgds (nvars ) 5 8 −
Table 1: Properties of the generated iBench scenarios.
Algorithm 2 returns a non-empty mapping that is safe w.r.t.MV, if
such a mapping exists. □
Proof. (Sketch) From Algorithm 3, we can see that frepair al-
ways computes a non-empty partially-safe mapping, if such a map-
ping exists. Note that a mapping, where no variable is exported and
no repeated variables occur in the body of the s-t tgds is always
partially-safe as long as, the predicates in the bodies of the s-t tgds
are the same with the ones occurring in the policy views. Please
also note that such a mapping is always considered by frepair. The
above argument, along with the fact that a partially-safe mapping
can be transformed into a safe one by turning exported variables
into non-exported ones by means of the function hideExported,
show that Proposition 3 holds. □
6 EXPERIMENTS
We investigate the efficiency of our repairing algorithmwith the use
of hard-coded preference function and with a preference function
based on a learning approach. The source code and the experimental
scenarios are publicly available at https://github.com/ucomignani/
MapRepair.git.
We evaluated our algorithm using a set of 3,600 scenarios with
each scenario consisting of a set of policy views and a set of s-t
tgds. The source schemas and the policy views have been syntheti-
cally generated using iBench, the state-of-the-art data integration
benchmark [1]. We considered relations of up to five attributes and
we created GAV mappings using the iBench configuration recom-
mended by [1]. We generated policy views by applying the iBench
operators copy, merging, deletion of attributes and self-join ten
times each. The characteristics of the scenarios are summarized in
Table 1. In each scenario, we used a different number of s-t tgds
ndep , a different number of body atoms natoms and a different
number of exported variables nvars .
We implemented our algorithm in Java and we used the Weka
library [9] that provides an off-the-shelf implementation of the
k-NN algorithm2. We ran our experiments on a laptop with one
2.6GHz 2-core processor, 16Gb of RAM, running Debian 9.
In the remainder, all data points have been computed as an
average on five runs preceded by one discarded cold run.
6.1 Running time of repair
First, we study the impact of the number of s-t tgds and of the
number of body atoms on the running time of repair. We adopt a
fixed preference function that chooses the repair with the maximum
number of exported variables, while, in case of ties, it chooses the
repair with the maximum number of joins. We range the number of
s-t tgds from 100 to 300 by steps of 50 and the number of body atoms
from three to five. The results are shown in Figure (2a). Figure (2a)
2https://github.com/ucomignani/MapRepair/blob/master/learning.md
Repairing mappings under policy views
shows that the performance of our algorithm is pretty high; the
median repairing time is less than 1.5s, while for the most complex
scenario containing up to five body atoms per s-t tgd, the median
running time is less than 8s with 71s being the maximum.
Figure (2b) shows the time breakdown for repair. The first col-
umn shows the average running time to run the visible chase over
the input s-t mappings, the second one shows the average running
time for checking the safety of the computed bags and the third
one shows the average running time for repairing the s-t tgds. The
results show that the repairing time is 32 times greater than tine
to compute the visible chase and 40 times greater than the time to
check the safety of the chase bags for scenarios with 300 s-t tgds. In
the simplest scenarios, these numbers are reduced to five and nine,
respectively. Overall, the absolute values of the rewriting times are
kept low for these scenarios and gracefully scale while increasing
the number of s-t tgds and the number of atoms in their bodies.
6.2 Time breakdown between frepair and srepair
Figure (2c) shows the average running time for frepair and srepair
for the considered scenarios. We can see that srepair is the most
time-consuming step of our algorithm. We can also see that the run-
ning time of srepair increases more in comparison to the running
time of frepair when increasing the number of the s-t tgds and the
number of atoms in their bodies. This is due to overhead that is in-
curred during the incremental computation of the visual chase after
repairing a s-t tgd (line 23 of Algorithm 4). Figure (2d) shows the
correlation between the number of active triggers detected while
incrementally computing the visual chase and the running time of
srepair for scenarios with 100 s-t tgds using the ANOVA method
(p-value < 2.2e−16). Figure (2d) shows that the most complex sce-
narios lead to the detection of more than 45, 000 active triggers.
Despite the high number of the detected active triggers, the running
time of srepair is kept low thus validating its efficiency.
6.2.1 Evaluating learning accuracy and efficiency. We adopted the fol-
lowing steps in order to evaluate the performance of our learning
approach. First, we defined the following two golden standard pref-
erence functions that we will try to learn:
• Pmax , which chooses the repair with the maximum number
of exported variables (i.e., the first repair if ∆FV < 0, else the
other repair) and in case of ties, it chooses the repair with
the maximum number of joins (i.e., the first repair if ∆J < 0,
else the second repair).
• Pavд , which computes the average value ∆ = ∆FV +∆J2 and
chooses the first repair, if ∆ < 0; otherwise, it chooses the
second repair.
For both preference functions, we created a training set of 10, 000
measurements for the k-NN classifier by running the repairing
algorithm on fresh scenarios of 50 s-t tgds and five body atoms per
s-t tgd. For each input vector ⟨δFV ,δ J ⟩ whose repair we wanted to
predict, we computed the Euclidean distance between ⟨δFV ,δ J ⟩ and
the vectors of the training set.We also set the value of parameterk to
1. This parameter controls the number of neighbors used to predict
the output. Higher values of this parameter led to comparable
predictions and are omitted for space reasons. Finally, we used the
trained k-NN classifier as a preference function in srepair, rerun
the scenarios from Section 6.1 and compared the returned repairs
with the ones returned when applying the golden standards Pmax
and Pavд as preference functions.
Learning Pmax . Table (2a) shows the confusion matrix associ-
ated to learning Pmax . The confusion matrix outlines the choices
undertaken during the iterations of the k-NN algorithm. In our case,
Table (2a) shows that µ1 has been selected 230 times, while µ2 has
been chosen 395,680 times. We can thus see that µ2 is chosen in the
vast majority of the cases. Notice that µ2 is also the default value
in cases where the preference function weights equally µ1 and µ2.
Apart from the confusion matrix, we also measured the accuracy
of learning the preference function, by weighing the closeness of
the learned mapping to the golden standard mapping.
We used the Matthews Correlation Coefficient metric (MCC) [2]
to compare the repairs returned by the trained k-NN classifier and
the ones returned when applied Pmax . This is a classical measure
that allows to evaluate the quality of ML classifiers when ranking
is computed between two possible values (in our case, the choice
between µ1 and µ2). This measure is calculated using the following:
• N1,1 the number of predictions of µ1 when µ1 is expected
• N2,2 the number of predictions of µ2 when µ2 is expected
• N1,2 the number of predictions of µ1 when µ2 is expected
• N2,1 the number of predictions of µ2 when µ1 is expected
MCC =
N1,1 × N2,2 − N1,2 × N2,1√(N1,1 + N1,2)(N1,1 + N2,1)(N2,2 + N1,2)(N2,2 + N2,1)
The results ofMCC range from −1 for the cases where the model
perfectly predicts the inverse of the expected values, to 1 for the
cases where the model predicts the expected values. The value
MCC = 0 means that there is no correlation between the predicted
value and the expected one. By applying MCC to the learning of
Pmax , we observed that the data are clearly discriminated, thus
leading to a perfect fit of our prediction in this case (MCC = 1).
Learning Pavд . Table (2b) shows the confusion matrix associated
to learning Pavд . We can see that the predictions are less accurate
in this case. The data is not as clearly discriminated as before,
leading to a fairly negligible error rate (< 0.02%). This error is still
acceptable for the learning, since only < 0.02% of the predictions
are erroneous. This is corroborated by aMCC value equal to 0.93,
thus leading to a still acceptable fit of our preference function also
in the case of Pavд .
6.2.2 Running time of repair with a learned preference function. In the
last experiment, we want to measure the impact of learning on the
performance of our algorithm. To this end, we compare the running
time of repair when adopting a hard-coded preference function (as
in the results reported in Figure 2) and when adopting a learned
preference function. Figure 3 shows the running times for the same
scenarios used in Figure 2. We can easily observe that the runtimes
are rather similar with and without learning and the difference
amounts to a few milliseconds. This further corroborates the utility
of learning the preference function and shows that the learning is
robust and does not deteriorate the performances of our algorithm.
7 CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem of safety checking w.r.t. a set of
policy views in a data exchange scenario. We have also proposed
efficient repairing algorithms that sanitize the mappings w.r.t. the
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(a) Repairing times. (b) Time comparisons.
(c) Time breakdown between frepair and srepair. (d) Running time of srepair over 100 s-t tgds.
Figure 2: Summary of the performance-related experimental results.
Figure 3: Repairing times with ML.
golden standard
prediction µ1 µ2
µ1 230 0
µ2 0 395680
(a) Pmax confusion matrix.
golden standard
prediction µ1 µ2
µ1 290 1
µ2 42 395577
(b) Pavд confusion matrix.
Table 2: Confusion matrix for the golden standards.
policy views, in cases where the former leak sensitive information.
Our approach is inherently data-independent and leads to obtaining
rewritings of the mappings guaranteeing privacy preservation at a
schema level. As such, our approach is orthogonal to several data-
dependent privacy-preservation methods, that can be used on the
companion source and target instances to further corroborate the
privacy guarantees. We envision several extensions of our work,
such as the study of general GLAV mappings and the interplay
between data-independent and data-dependent privacy methods.
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